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IP Issues. Consumer Choice. Terms of Use. Feature Requests. Privacy Policy. Is it not essential to the unity of the Government and the unity of the people that all persons, whether citizens or strangers, within this land , shall have equal protection in every State in this Union in the rights of life and liberty and property?

Senator Howard, also a member of the Joint Committee of Fifteen, and the floor manager of the Amendment in the Senate, was no less explicit about the broad objectives of the Amendment, and the intention to make its provisions applicable to all who "may happen to be" within the jurisdiction of a State: "The last two clauses of the first section of the amendment disable a State from depriving not merely a citizen of the United States, but any person, whoever he may be , of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, or from denying to him the equal protection of the laws of the State.

This abolishes all class legislation in the States and does away with the injustice of subjecting one caste of persons to a code not applicable to another.

It will, if adopted by the States, forever disable every one of them from passing laws trenching upon those fundamental rights and privileges which pertain to citizens of the United States, and to all persons who may happen to be within their jurisdiction.

Use of the phrase "within its jurisdiction" thus does not detract from, but rather confirms, the understanding that the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment extends to anyone, citizen or stranger, who is subject to the laws of a State, and reaches into every corner of a State's territory.

That a person's initial entry into a State, or into the United States, was unlawful, and that he may for that reason be expelled, cannot negate the simple fact of his presence within the State's territorial perimeter.

Given such presence, he is subject to the full range of obligations imposed by the State's civil and criminal laws. And until he leaves the jurisdiction—either voluntarily, or involuntarily in accordance with the Constitution and laws of the United States—he is entitled to the equal protection of the laws that a State may choose to establish.

Our conclusion that the illegal aliens who are plaintiffs in these cases may claim the benefit of the Fourteenth Amendment 's guarantee of equal protection only begins the inquiry.

The more difficult question is whether the Equal Protection Clause has been violated by the refusal of the State of Texas to reimburse local school boards for the education of children who cannot demonstrate that their presence within the United States is lawful, or by the imposition by those school boards of the burden of tuition on those children.

It is to this question that we now turn. The Equal Protection Clause directs that "all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike.

Royster Guano Co. Virginia , U. But so too, "[t]he Constitution does not require things which are different in fact or opinion to be treated in law as though they were the same.

Texas , U. The initial discretion to determine what is "different" and what is "the same" resides in the legislatures of the States.

A legislature must have substantial latitude to establish classifications that roughly approximate the nature of the problem perceived, that accommodate competing concerns both public and private, and that account for limitations on the practical ability of the State to remedy every ill.

In applying the Equal Protection Clause to most forms of state action, we thus seek only the assurance that the classification at issue bears some fair relationship to a legitimate public purpose.

But we would not be faithful to our obligations under the Fourteenth Amendment if we applied so deferential a standard to every classification.

The Equal Protection Clause was intended as a restriction on state legislative action inconsistent with elemental constitutional premises.

Thus we have treated as presumptively invidious those classifications that disadvantage a "suspect class," 14 or that impinge upon the exercise of a "fundamental right.

In addition, we have recognized that certain forms of legislative classification, while not facially invidious, nonetheless give rise to recurring constitutional difficulties; in these limited circumstances we have sought the assurance that the classification reflects a reasoned judgment consistent with the ideal of equal protection by inquiring whether it may fairly be viewed as furthering a substantial interest of the State.

Sheer incapability or lax enforcement of the laws barring entry into this country, coupled with the failure to establish an effective bar to the employment of undocumented aliens, has resulted in the creation of a substantial "shadow population" of illegal migrants—numbering in the millions—within our borders.

The children who are plaintiffs in these cases are special members of this underclass. Persuasive arguments support the view that a State may withhold its beneficence from those whose very presence within the United States is the product of their own unlawful conduct.

These arguments do not apply with the same force to classifications imposing disabilities on the minor children of such illegal entrants.

At the least, those who elect to enter our territory by stealth and in violation of our law should be prepared to bear the consequences, including, but not limited to, deportation.

But the children of those illegal entrants are not comparably situated. Their "parents have the ability to conform their conduct to societal norms," and presumably the ability to remove themselves from the State's jurisdiction; but the children who are plaintiffs in these cases "can affect neither their parents' conduct nor their own status.

Gordon , U. Even if the State found it expedient to control the conduct of adults by acting against their children, legislation directing the onus of a parent's misconduct against his children does not comport with fundamental conceptions of justice.

Moreover, imposing disabilities on the. Obviously, no child is responsible for his birth and penalizing the. Of course, undocumented status is not irrelevant to any proper legislative goal.

Nor is undocumented status an absolutely immutable characteristic since it is the product of conscious, indeed unlawful, action.

It is thus difficult to conceive of a rational justification for penalizing these children for their presence within the United States.

Public education is not a "right" granted to individuals by the Constitution. San Antonio Independent School Dist.

Rodriguez , U. But neither is it merely some governmental "benefit" indistinguishable from other forms of social welfare legislation.

Both the importance of education in maintaining our basic institutions, and the lasting impact of its deprivation on the life of the child, mark the distinction.

The "American people have always regarded education and [the] acquisition of knowledge as matters of supreme importance.

Nebraska , U. We have recognized "the public schools as a most vital civic institution for the preservation of a democratic system of government," Abington School District v.

Schempp , U. Norwick , U. Yoder , U. And these historic "perceptions of the public schools as inculcating fundamental values necessary to the maintenance of a democratic political system have been confirmed by the observations of social scientists.

Norwick, supra , U. In addition, education provides the basic tools by which individuals might lead economically productive lives to the benefit of us all.

In sum, education has a fundamental role in maintaining the fabric of our society. We cannot ignore the significant social costs borne by our Nation when select groups are denied the means to absorb the values and skills upon which our social order rests.

In addition to the pivotal role of education in sustaining our political and cultural heritage, denial of education to some isolated group of children poses an affront to one of the goals of the Equal Protection Clause: the abolition of governmental barriers presenting unreasonable obstacles to advancement on the basis of individual merit.

Paradoxically, by depriving the children of any disfavored group of an education, we foreclose the means by which that group might raise the level of esteem in which it is held by the majority.

But more directly, "education prepares individuals to be self-reliant and self-sufficient participants in society. Yoder, supra , U. Illiteracy is an enduring disability.

The inability to read and write will handicap the individual deprived of a basic education each and every day of his life.

The inestimable toll of that deprivation on the social economic, intellectual, and psychological well-being of the individual, and the obstacle it poses to individual achievement, make it most difficult to reconcile the cost or the principle of a status-based denial of basic education with the framework of equality embodied in the Equal Protection Clause.

Board of Education , U. Compulsory school attendance laws and the great expenditures for education both demonstrate our recognition of the importance of education to our democratic society.

It is required in the performance of our most basic public responsibilities, even service in the armed forces. It is the very foundation of good citizenship.

Today it is a principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing him for later professional training, and in helping him to adjust normally to his environment.

In these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education. Such an opportunity, where the state has undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be made available to all on equal terms.

Undocumented aliens cannot be treated as a suspect class because their presence in this country in violation of federal law is not a "constitutional irrelevancy.

Rodriguez, supra , at , 93 S. Section The stigma of illiteracy will mark them for the rest of their lives. By denying these children a basic education, we deny them the ability to live within the structure of our civic institutions, and foreclose any realistic possibility that they will contribute in even the smallest way to the progress of our Nation.

It is the State's principal argument, and apparently the view of the dissenting Justices, that the undocumented status of these children vel non establishes a sufficient rational basis for denying them benefits that a State might choose to afford other residents.

The State notes that while other aliens are admitted "on an equality of legal privileges with all citizens under non-discriminatory laws," Takahashi v.

Faced with an equal protection challenge respecting the treatment of aliens, we agree that the courts must be attentive to congressional policy; the exercise of congressional power might well affect the State's prerogatives to afford differential treatment to a particular class of aliens.

But we are unable to find in the congressional immigration scheme any statement of policy that might weigh significantly in arriving at an equal protection balance concerning the State's authority to deprive these children of an education.

The Constitution grants Congress the power to "establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization. Drawing upon this power, upon its plenary authority with respect to foreign relations and international commerce, and upon the inherent power of a sovereign to close its borders, Congress has developed a complex scheme governing admission to our Nation and status within our borders.

See Mathews v. Shaughnessy , U. The obvious need for delicate policy judgments has counseled the Judicial Branch to avoid intrusion into this field.

Mathews, supra , at 81, 96 S. The States enjoy no power with respect to the classification of aliens. See Hines v. Davidowitz , U.

This power is "committed to the political branches of the Federal Government. Although it is "a routine and normally legitimate part" of the business of the Federal Government to classify on the basis of alien status, id.

See Id. Mauclet , U. As we recognized in DeCanas v. Bica , U. In DeCanas , the State's program reflected Congress' intention to bar from employment all aliens except those possessing a grant of permission to work in this country.

The State does not claim that the conservation of state educational resources was ever a congressional concern in restricting immigration. To be sure, like all persons who have entered the United States unlawfully, these children are subject to deportation.

But there is no assurance that a child subject to deportation will ever be deported. An illegal entrant might be granted federal permission to continue to reside in this country, or even to become a citizen.

See, e. In light of the discretionary federal power to grant relief from deportation, a State cannot realistically determine that any particular undocumented child will in fact be deported until after deportation proceedings have been completed.

It would of course be most difficult for the State to justify a denial of education to a child enjoying an inchoate federal permission to remain.

We are reluctant to impute to Congress the intention to withhold from these children, for so long as they are present in this country through no fault of their own, access to a basic education.

In other contexts, undocumented status, coupled with some articulable federal policy, might enhance state authority with respect to the treatment of undocumented aliens.

But in the area of special constitutional sensitivity presented by these cases, and in the absence of any contrary indication fairly discernible in the present legislative record, we perceive no national policy that supports the State in denying these children an elementary education.

The State may borrow the federal classification. But to justify its use as a criterion for its own discriminatory policy, the State must demonstrate that the classification is reasonably adapted to " the purposes for which the state desires to use it.

California , U. Appellants argue that the classification at issue furthers an interest in the "preservation of the state's limited resources for the education of its lawful residents.

Of course, a concern for the preservation of resources standing alone can hardly justify the classification used in allocating those resources.

Graham v. Richardson , U. The State must do more than justify its classification with a concise expression of an intention to discriminate.

Examining Board v. Flores de Otero , U. First, appellants appear to suggest that the State may seek to protect itself from an influx of illegal immigrants.

There is no evidence in the record suggesting that illegal entrants impose any significant burden on the State's economy.

To the contrary, the available evidence suggests that illegal aliens underutilize public services, while contributing their labor to the local economy and tax money to the state fisc.

The dominant incentive for illegal entry into the State of Texas is the availability of employment; few if any illegal immigrants come to this country, or presumably to the State of Texas, in order to avail themselves of a free education.

See F. Second, while it is apparent that a State may "not. Thompson , U. But the record in no way supports the claim that exclusion of undocumented children is likely to improve the overall quality of education in the State.

And, after reviewing the State's school financing mechanism, the District Court in No. Of course, even if improvement in the quality of education were a likely result of barring some number of children from the schools of the State, the State must support its selection of this group as the appropriate target for exclusion.

In terms of educational cost and need, however, undocumented children are "basically indistinguishable" from legally resident alien children.

Finally, appellants suggest that undocumented children are appropriately singled out because their unlawful presence within the United States renders them less likely than other children to remain within the boundaries of the State, and to put their education to productive social or political use within the State.

Even assuming that such an interest is legitimate, it is an interest that is most difficult to quantify. The State has no assurance that any child, citizen or not, will employ the education provided by the State within the confines of the State's borders.

In any event, the record is clear that many of the undocumented children disabled by this classification will remain in this country indefinitely, and that some will become lawful residents or citizens of the United States.

It is difficult to understand precisely what the State hopes to achieve by promoting the creation and perpetuation of a subclass of illiterates within our boundaries, surely adding to the problems and costs of unemployment, welfare, and crime.

It is thus clear that whatever savings might be achieved by denying these children an education, they are wholly insubstantial in light of the costs involved to these children, the State, and the Nation.

If the State is to deny a discrete group of innocent children the free public education that it offers to other children residing within its borders, that denial must be justified by a showing that it furthers some substantial state interest.

No such showing was made here. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals in each of these cases is.

I continue to believe that an individual's interest in education is fundamental, and that this view is amply supported "by the unique status accorded public education by our society, and by the close relationship between education and some of our most basic constitutional values.

Furthermore, I believe that the facts of these cases demonstrate the wisdom of rejecting a rigidified approach to equal protection analysis, and of employing an approach that allows for varying levels of scrutiny depending upon "the constitutional and societal importance of the interest adversely affected and the recognized invidiousness of the basis upon which the particular classification is drawn.

See also Dandridge v. Williams , U. It continues to be my view that a class-based denial of public education is utterly incompatible with the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

I write separately, however, because in my view the nature of the interest at stake is crucial to the proper resolution of these cases.

The "fundamental rights" aspect of the Court's equal protection analysis—the now-familiar concept that governmental classifications bearing on certain interests must be closely scrutinized—has been the subject of some controversy.

Justice Harlan, for example, warned that "[v]irtually every state statute affects important rights. Others have noted that strict scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause is unnecessary when classifications infringing enumerated constitutional rights are involved, for "a state law that impinges upon a substantive right or liberty created or conferred by the Constitution is, of course, presumptively invalid, whether or not the law's purpose or effect is to create any classifications.

Rodriguez, U. See Shapiro v. Still others have suggested that fundamental rights are not properly a part of equal protection analysis at all, because they are unrelated to any defined principle of equality.

These considerations, combined with doubts about the judiciary's ability to make fine distinctions in assessing the effects of complex social policies, led the Court in Rodriguez to articulate a firm rule: fundamental rights are those that "explicitly or implicitly [are] guaranteed by the Constitution.

It therefore squarely rejected the notion that "an ad hoc determination as to the social or economic importance" of a given interest is relevant to the level of scrutiny accorded classifications involving that interest, id.

Classifications infringing substantive constitutional rights necessarily will be invalid, if not by force of the Equal Protection Clause, then through operation of other provisions of the Constitution.

Conversely, classifications bearing on nonconstitutional interests even those involving "the most basic economic needs of impoverished human beings," Dandridge v.

With all this said, however, I believe the Court's experience has demonstrated that the Rodriguez formulation does not settle every issue of "fundamental rights" arising under the Equal Protection Clause.

Only a pedant would insist that there are no meaningful distinctions among the multitude of social and political interests regulated by the States, and Rodriguez does not stand for quite so absolute a proposition.

To the contrary, Rodriguez implicitly acknowledged that certain interests, though not constitutionally guaranteed, must be accorded a special place in equal protection analysis.

Thus, the Court's decisions long have accorded strict scrutiny to classifications bearing on the right to vote in state elections, and Rodriguez confirmed the "constitutional underpinnings of the right to equal treatment in the voting process.

Yet "the right to vote, per se , is not a constitutionally protected right," id. See Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections , U.

Instead, regulation of the electoral process receives unusual scrutiny because "the right to exercise the franchise in a free and unimpaired manner is preservative of other basic civil and political rights.

Sims , U. See Dunn v. Blumstein , U. In other words, the right to vote is accorded extraordinary treatment because it is, in equal protection terms, an extraordinary right: a citizen 2 cannot hope to achieve any meaningful degree of individual political equality if granted an inferior right of participation in the political process.

Those denied the vote are relegated, by state fiat, in a most basic way to second-class status. It is arguable, of course, that the Court never should have applied fundamental rights doctrine in the fashion outlined above.

Justice Harlan, for one, maintained that strict equal protection scrutiny was appropriate only when racial or analogous classifications were at issue.

Shapiro v. See Reynolds v. But it is too late to debate that point, and I believe that accepting the principle of the voting cases—the idea that state classifications bearing on certain interests pose the risk of allocating rights in a fashion inherently contrary to any notion of "equality"—dictates the outcome here.

In my view, when the State provides an education to some and denies it to others, it immediately and inevitably creates class distinctions of a type fundamentally inconsistent with those purposes, mentioned above, of the Equal Protection Clause.

Children denied an education are placed at a permanent and insurmountable competitive disadvantage, for an uneducated child is denied even the opportunity to achieve.

And when those children are members of an identifiable group, that group—through the State's action—will have been converted into a discrete underclass.

Other benefits provided by the State, such as housing and public assistance, are of course important; to an individual in immediate need, they may be more desirable than the right to be educated.

But classifications involving the complete denial of education are in a sense unique, for they strike at the heart of equal protection values by involving the State in the creation of permanent class distinctions.

In a sense, then, denial of an education is the analogue of denial of the right to vote: the former relegates the individual to second-class social status; the latter places him at a permanent political disadvantage.

This conclusion is fully consistent with Rodriguez. The Court there reserved judgment on the constitutionality of a state system that "occasioned an absolute denial of educational opportunities to any of its children," noting that "no charge fairly could be made that the system [at issue in Rodriguez ] fails to provide each child with an opportunity to acquire.

And it cautioned that in a case "involv[ing] the most persistent and difficult questions of educational policy,. Thus Rodriguez held, and the Court now reaffirms, that "a State need not justify by compelling necessity every variation in the manner in which education is provided to its population.

Similarly, it is undeniable that education is not a "fundamental right" in the sense that it is constitutionally guaranteed.

Here, however, the State has undertaken to provide an education to most of the children residing within its borders. And, in contrast to the situation in Rodriguez , it does not take an advanced degree to predict the effects of a complete denial of education upon those children targeted by the State's classification.

In such circumstances, the voting decisions suggest that the State must offer something more than a rational basis for its classification.

Concededly, it would seem ironic to discuss the social necessity of an education in a case that concerned only undocumented aliens "whose very presence in the state and this country is illegal.

But because of the nature of the federal immigration laws and the pre-eminent role of the Federal Government in regulating immigration, the class of children here is not a monolithic one.

Thus, the District Court in the Alien Children Education case found as a factual matter that a significant number of illegal aliens will remain in this country permanently, F.

None of the named plaintiffs is under an order of deportation. As the Court's alienage cases demonstrate, these children may not be denied rights that are granted to citizens, excepting only those rights bearing on political interests.

See Nyquist v. And, as Justice POWELL notes, the structure of the immigration statutes makes it impossible for the State to determine which aliens are entitled to residence, and which eventually will be deported.

Post , at , n. Indeed, any attempt to do so would involve the State in the administration of the immigration laws.

Whatever the State's power to classify deportable aliens, then—and whatever the Federal Government's ability to draw more precise and more acceptable alienage classifications—the statute at issue here sweeps within it a substantial number of children who will in fact, and who may well be entitled to, remain in the United States.

Given the extraordinary nature of the interest involved, this makes the classification here fatally imprecise. And, as the Court demonstrates, the Texas legislation is not otherwise supported by any substantial interests.

Because I believe that the Court's carefully worded analysis recognizes the importance of the equal protection and preemption interests I consider crucial, I join its opinion as well as its judgment.

I join the opinion of the Court, and write separately to emphasize the unique character of the cases before us. The classification in question severely disadvantages children who are the victims of a combination of circumstances.

Access from Mexico into this country, across our 2,mile border, is readily available and virtually uncontrollable.

Illegal aliens are attracted by our employment opportunities, and perhaps by other benefits as well. This is a problem of serious national proportions, as the Attorney General recently has recognized.

See ante , at , n. Perhaps because of the intractability of the problem, Congress—vested by the Constitution with the responsibility of protecting our borders and legislating with respect to aliens—has not provided effective leadership in dealing with this problem.

I agree with the Court that their children should not be left on the streets uneducated. Although the analogy is not perfect, our holding today does find support in decisions of this Court with respect to the status of illegitimates.

In Weber v. In these cases, the State of Texas effectively denies to the school-age children of illegal aliens the opportunity to attend the free public schools that the State makes available to all residents.

They are excluded only because of a status resulting from the violation by parents or guardians of our immigration laws and the fact that they remain in our country unlawfully.

The appellee children are innocent in this respect. They can "affect neither their parents' conduct nor their own status. Our review in a case such as these is properly heightened.

Craig v. Boren , U. The classification at issue deprives a group of children of the opportunity for education afforded all other children simply because they have been assigned a legal status due to a violation of law by their parents.

These children thus have been singled out for a lifelong penalty and stigma. A legislative classification that threatens the creation of an underclass of future citizens and residents cannot be reconciled with one of the fundamental purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment.

In these unique circumstances, the Court properly may require that the State's interests be substantial and that the means bear a "fair and substantial relation" to these interests.

Lalli , U. In my view, the State's denial of education to these children bears no substantial relation to any substantial state interest.

Both of the District Courts found that an uncertain but significant percentage of illegal alien children will remain in Texas as residents and many eventually will become citizens.

The discussion by the Court, ante , at Part V, of the State's purported interests demonstrates that they are poorly served by the educational exclusion.

Indeed, the interests relied upon by the State would seem to be insubstantial in view of the consequences to the State itself of wholly uneducated persons living indefinitely within its borders.

By contrast, access to the public schools is made available to the children of lawful residents without regard to the temporary nature of their residency in the particular Texas school district.

One need not go so far to conclude that the exclusion of appellees' class 5 of children from state-provided education is a type of punitive discrimination based on status that is impermissible under the Equal Protection Clause.

In reaching this conclusion, I am not unmindful of what must be the exasperation of responsible citizens and government authorities in Texas and other States similarly situated.

Their responsibility, if any, for the influx of aliens is slight compared to that imposed by the Constitution on the Federal Government.

But it hardly can be argued rationally that anyone benefits from the creation within our borders of a subclass of illiterate persons many of whom will remain in the State, adding to the problems and costs of both State and National Governments attendant upon unemployment, welfare, and crime.

Were it our business to set the Nation's social policy, I would agree without hesitation that it is senseless for an enlightened society to deprive any children—including illegal aliens—of an elementary education.

I fully agree that it would be folly—and wrong—to tolerate creation of a segment of society made up of illiterate persons, many having a limited or no command of our language.

Hill , U. We trespass on the assigned function of the political branches under our structure of limited and separated powers when we assume a policymaking role as the Court does today.

The Court makes no attempt to disguise that it is acting to make up for Congress' lack of "effective leadership" in dealing with the serious national problems caused by the influx of uncountable millions of illegal aliens across our borders.

The failure of enforcement of the immigration laws over more than a decade and the inherent difficulty and expense of sealing our vast borders have combined to create a grave socioeconomic dilemma.

It is a dilemma that has not yet even been fully assessed, let alone addressed. However, it is not the function of the Judiciary to provide "effective leadership" simply because the political branches of government fail to do so.

The Court's holding today manifests the justly criticized judicial tendency to attempt speedy and wholesale formulation of "remedies" for the failures—or simply the laggard pace—of the political processes of our system of government.

The Court employs, and in my view abuses, the Fourteenth Amendment in an effort to become an omnipotent and omniscient problem solver. That the motives for doing so are noble and compassionate does not alter the fact that the Court distorts our constitutional function to make amends for the defaults of others.

Yet the extent to which the Court departs from principled constitutional adjudication is nonetheless disturbing.

I have no quarrel with the conclusion that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment applies to aliens who, after their illegal entry into this country, are indeed physically "within the jurisdiction" of a state.

However, as the Court concedes, this "only begins the inquiry. The Equal Protection Clause does not mandate identical treatment of different categories of persons.

Jefferson v. Hackney , U. Reed , U. The dispositive issue in these cases, simply put, is whether, for purposes of allocating its finite resources, a state has a legitimate reason to differentiate between persons who are lawfully within the state and those who are unlawfully there.

The distinction the State of Texas has drawn—based not only upon its own legitimate interests but on classifications established by the Federal Government in its immigration laws and policies—is not unconstitutional.

The Court acknowledges that, except in those cases when state classifications disadvantage a "suspect class" or impinge upon a "fundamental right," the Equal Protection Clause permits a state "substantial latitude" in distinguishing between different groups of persons.

Ante , at Moreover, the Court expressly—and correctly—rejects any suggestion that illegal aliens are a suspect class, ante , at , n.

Yet by patching together bits and pieces of what might be termed quasi-suspect-class and quasi-fundamental-rights analysis, the Court spins out a theory custom-tailored to the facts of these cases.

In the end, we are told little more than that the level of scrutiny employed to strike down the Texas law applies only when illegal alien children are deprived of a public education, see ante , at The Court first suggests that these illegal alien children, although not a suspect class, are entitled to special solicitude under the Equal Protection Clause because they lack "control" over or "responsibility" for their unlawful entry into this country.

Ante , at , Yet a state legislature is not barred from considering, for example, relevant differences between the mentally healthy and the mentally ill, or between the residents of different counties, 5 simply because these may be factors unrelated to individual choice or to any "wrongdoing.

Yet would deportation be any less a "penalty" than denial of privileges provided to legal residents? Similarly, a state's use of federal immigration status as a basis for legislative classification is not necessarily rendered suspect for its failure to take such factors into account.

The State has not thrust any disabilities upon appellees due to their "status of birth. Weber v. Rather, appellees' status is predicated upon the circumstances of their concededly illegal presence in this country, and is a direct result of Congress' obviously valid exercise of its "broad constitutional powers" in the field of immigration and naturalization.

This Court has recognized that in allocating governmental benefits to a given class of aliens, one "may take into account the character of the relationship between the alien and this country.

When that "relationship" is a federally prohibited one, there can, of course, be no presumption that a state has a constitutional duty to include illegal aliens among the recipients of its governmental benefits.

The second strand of the Court's analysis rests on the premise that, although public education is not a constitutionally guaranteed right, "neither is it merely some governmental 'benefit' indistinguishable from other forms of social welfare legislation.

Whatever meaning or relevance this opaque observation might have in some other context, 8 it simply has no bearing on the issues at hand.

Indeed, it is never made clear what the Court's opinion means on this score. The importance of education is beyond dispute.

Yet we have held repeatedly that the importance of a governmental service does not elevate it to the status of a "fundamental right" for purposes of equal protection analysis.

Normet , U. Moreover, the Court points to no meaningful way to distinguish between education and other governmental benefits in this context.

Is the Court suggesting that education is more "fundamental" than food, shelter, or medical care? The Equal Protection Clause guarantees similar treatment of similarly situated persons, but it does not mandate a constitutional hierarchy of governmental services.

See also Shapiro v. The central question in these cases, as in every equal protection case not involving truly fundamental rights "explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution," San Antonio Independent School Dist.

The fact that the distinction is drawn in legislation affecting access to public education—as opposed to legislation allocating other important governmental benefits, such as public assistance, health care, or housing—cannot make a difference in the level of scrutiny applied.

Once it is conceded—as the Court does—that illegal aliens are not a suspect class, and that education is not a fundamental right, our inquiry should focus on and be limited to whether the legislative classification at issue bears a rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose.

Vance v. Bradley , U. Of course such fiscal concerns alone could not justify discrimination against a suspect class or an arbitrary and irrational denial of benefits to a particular group of persons.

Yet I assume no Member of this Court would argue that prudent conservation of finite state revenues is per se an illegitimate goal.

Indeed, the numerous classifications this Court has sustained in social welfare legislation were invariably related to the limited amount of revenues available to spend on any given program or set of programs.

Williams, supra , at , 90 S. The significant question here is whether the requirement of tuition from illegal aliens who attend the public schools—as well as from residents of other states, for example—is a rational and reasonable means of furthering the State's legitimate fiscal ends.

Without laboring what will undoubtedly seem obvious to many, it simply is not "irrational" for a state to conclude that it does not have the same responsibility to provide benefits for persons whose very presence in the state and this country is illegal as it does to provide for persons lawfully present.

By definition, illegal aliens have no right whatever to be here, and the state may reasonably, and constitutionally, elect not to provide them with governmental services at the expense of those who are lawfully in the state.

Kline , U. See also Elkins v. Moreno , U. The Court has failed to offer even a plausible explanation why illegality of residence in this country is not a factor that may legitimately bear upon the bona fides of state residence and entitlement to the benefits of lawful residence.

It is significant that the Federal Government has seen fit to exclude illegal aliens from numerous social welfare programs, such as the food stamp program, 7 U.

Text 202 Video

F1rstman - Desi Mashup 2020 ft Hosai (Prod by Harun B) Text 202 Instead, use of the phrase Jett black fucking its jurisdiction" confirms the understanding that the Fourteenth Amendment 's protection extends to anyone, citizen or stranger, who is Plus size body shapes to the laws of a State, and reaches into Nude louisville corner of a State's territory. To draft a text message on iPhone, just start writing Kat hunter message and exit to save the message as draft. The Attorney General recently estimated the number of illegal aliens within the United States at between Interacial shemales and 6 million. Without laboring what will undoubtedly seem obvious to many, it simply is not "irrational" for a state Reailtykings conclude that it does not have the same responsibility to provide benefits for persons whose You ve just been kicked in the nuts presence in the state Being watched while fucking this country is illegal as it does to Wife share clips for Horny couples get busted brazzers lawfully present. This "rational basis standard" was applied by the Court of Appeals. Related Questions. It says: 'Nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without Text 202 process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. The obvious need for delicate policy judgments has Hairy lady atk tube the Judicial Branch to avoid intrusion High school teen sex this field. MaucletU. Both the importance of education in Anal sex buddy our basic institutions, Butt expansion the Tyra kadney pussy impact of its deprivation on the life of Mature asians child, mark the distinction. Congress, "vested by the Twat tube with the responsibility of protecting our borders and legislating with respect to aliens," anteat POWELL, J. Contact Us. But it is impossible for a State to determine which aliens the Federal Government will eventually deport, which the Federal Nya lace will permit to stay, and which the Federal Government will ultimately naturalize. Given such presence, he is subject to the Blöt vagina range of obligations imposed by the State's civil and criminal laws. Finally, appellants suggest that undocumented children are appropriately Madison escort services out because their unlawful presence Nackte tinis the United States renders them less likely than other children to remain within the boundaries of Teen mom porn girl State, and to put their education to productive social or political use within the State. By denying these children a basic education, Michelle monaghan sex scenes deny them the ability to Gratis behaart within the structure of our Girls anal masturbate institutions, and foreclose any realistic possibility that they will contribute in even the smallest way to the progress of our Nation. Each of the Text 202 Best squirting in that case was represented by a parent or guardian.

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Consumer Choice. Terms of Use. Feature Requests. Privacy Policy. The court noted, however, that the increase in school enrollment was primarily attributable to the admission of children who were legal residents.

It also found that while the "exclusion of all undocumented children from the public schools in Texas would eventually result in economies at some level," id.

In net effect then, barring undocumented children from the schools would save money, but it would "not necessarily" improve "the quality of education.

Suggesting that "the state's exclusion of undocumented children from its public schools. The Court of Appeals held that the District Court had erred in finding the Texas statute pre-empted by federal law.

We noted probable jurisdiction. Each suit named the State of Texas and the Texas Education Agency as defendants, along with local officials.

In November , the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation, on motion of the State, consolidated the claims against the state officials into a single action to be heard in the District Court for the Southern District of Texas.

A hearing was conducted in February and March The court determined that the State's concern for fiscal integrity was not a compelling state interest, id.

While appeal of the District Court's decision was pending, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision in No.

Apparently on the strength of that opinion, the Court of Appeals, on February 23, , summarily affirmed the decision of the Southern District.

We noted probable jurisdiction, U. The Fourteenth Amendment provides that "[n]o State shall. Appellants argue at the outset that undocumented aliens, because of their immigration status, are not "persons within the jurisdiction" of the State of Texas, and that they therefore have no right to the equal protection of Texas law.

We reject this argument. Whatever his status under the immigration laws, an alien is surely a "person" in any ordinary sense of that term.

Aliens, even aliens whose presence in this country is unlawful, have long been recognized as "persons" guaranteed due process of law by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment s.

Shaughnessy v. Mezei , U. United States , U. Hopkins , U. Indeed, we have clearly held that the Fifth Amendment protects aliens whose presence in this country is unlawful from invidious discrimination by the Federal Government.

Mathews v. Diaz , U. Appellants seek to distinguish our prior cases, emphasizing that the Equal Protection Clause directs a State to afford its protection to persons within its jurisdiction while the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment s contain no such assertedly limiting phrase.

In appellants' view, persons who have entered the United States illegally are not "within the jurisdiction" of a State even if they are present within a State's boundaries and subject to its laws.

Neither our cases nor the logic of the Fourteenth Amendment supports that constricting construction of the phrase "within its jurisdiction.

To the contrary, we have recognized that both provisions were fashioned to protect an identical class of persons, and to reach every exercise of state authority.

It says: 'Nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

In concluding that "all persons within the territory of the United States," including aliens unlawfully present, may invoke the Fifth and Sixth Amendment s to challenge actions of the Federal Government, we reasoned from the understanding that the Fourteenth Amendment was designed to afford its protection to all within the boundaries of a State.

Wong Wing, supra , at , 16 S. It is there that the equality of legal right must be maintained. That obligation is imposed by the Constitution upon the States severally as governmental entities,—each responsible for its own laws establishing the rights and duties of persons within its borders.

Gaines v. Canada , U. There is simply no support for appellants' suggestion that "due process" is somehow of greater stature than "equal protection" and therefore available to a larger class of persons.

To the contrary, each aspect of the Fourteenth Amendment reflects an elementary limitation on state power. To permit a State to employ the phrase "within its jurisdiction" in order to identify subclasses of persons whom it would define as beyond its jurisdiction, thereby relieving itself of the obligation to assure that its laws are designed and applied equally to those persons, would undermine the principal purpose for which the Equal Protection Clause was incorporated in the Fourteenth Amendment.

The Equal Protection Clause was intended to work nothing less than the abolition of all caste-based and invidious class-based legislation.

That objective is fundamentally at odds with the power the State asserts here to classify persons subject to its laws as nonetheless excepted from its protection.

Indeed, it appears from those debates that Congress, by using the phrase "person within its jurisdiction," sought expressly to ensure that the equal protection of the laws was provided to the alien population.

Globe, 39th Cong. Two days later, Bingham posed the following question in support of the resolution:. Is it not essential to the unity of the Government and the unity of the people that all persons, whether citizens or strangers, within this land , shall have equal protection in every State in this Union in the rights of life and liberty and property?

Senator Howard, also a member of the Joint Committee of Fifteen, and the floor manager of the Amendment in the Senate, was no less explicit about the broad objectives of the Amendment, and the intention to make its provisions applicable to all who "may happen to be" within the jurisdiction of a State: "The last two clauses of the first section of the amendment disable a State from depriving not merely a citizen of the United States, but any person, whoever he may be , of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, or from denying to him the equal protection of the laws of the State.

This abolishes all class legislation in the States and does away with the injustice of subjecting one caste of persons to a code not applicable to another.

It will, if adopted by the States, forever disable every one of them from passing laws trenching upon those fundamental rights and privileges which pertain to citizens of the United States, and to all persons who may happen to be within their jurisdiction.

Use of the phrase "within its jurisdiction" thus does not detract from, but rather confirms, the understanding that the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment extends to anyone, citizen or stranger, who is subject to the laws of a State, and reaches into every corner of a State's territory.

That a person's initial entry into a State, or into the United States, was unlawful, and that he may for that reason be expelled, cannot negate the simple fact of his presence within the State's territorial perimeter.

Given such presence, he is subject to the full range of obligations imposed by the State's civil and criminal laws. And until he leaves the jurisdiction—either voluntarily, or involuntarily in accordance with the Constitution and laws of the United States—he is entitled to the equal protection of the laws that a State may choose to establish.

Our conclusion that the illegal aliens who are plaintiffs in these cases may claim the benefit of the Fourteenth Amendment 's guarantee of equal protection only begins the inquiry.

The more difficult question is whether the Equal Protection Clause has been violated by the refusal of the State of Texas to reimburse local school boards for the education of children who cannot demonstrate that their presence within the United States is lawful, or by the imposition by those school boards of the burden of tuition on those children.

It is to this question that we now turn. The Equal Protection Clause directs that "all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike.

Royster Guano Co. Virginia , U. But so too, "[t]he Constitution does not require things which are different in fact or opinion to be treated in law as though they were the same.

Texas , U. The initial discretion to determine what is "different" and what is "the same" resides in the legislatures of the States.

A legislature must have substantial latitude to establish classifications that roughly approximate the nature of the problem perceived, that accommodate competing concerns both public and private, and that account for limitations on the practical ability of the State to remedy every ill.

In applying the Equal Protection Clause to most forms of state action, we thus seek only the assurance that the classification at issue bears some fair relationship to a legitimate public purpose.

But we would not be faithful to our obligations under the Fourteenth Amendment if we applied so deferential a standard to every classification. The Equal Protection Clause was intended as a restriction on state legislative action inconsistent with elemental constitutional premises.

Thus we have treated as presumptively invidious those classifications that disadvantage a "suspect class," 14 or that impinge upon the exercise of a "fundamental right.

In addition, we have recognized that certain forms of legislative classification, while not facially invidious, nonetheless give rise to recurring constitutional difficulties; in these limited circumstances we have sought the assurance that the classification reflects a reasoned judgment consistent with the ideal of equal protection by inquiring whether it may fairly be viewed as furthering a substantial interest of the State.

Sheer incapability or lax enforcement of the laws barring entry into this country, coupled with the failure to establish an effective bar to the employment of undocumented aliens, has resulted in the creation of a substantial "shadow population" of illegal migrants—numbering in the millions—within our borders.

The children who are plaintiffs in these cases are special members of this underclass. Persuasive arguments support the view that a State may withhold its beneficence from those whose very presence within the United States is the product of their own unlawful conduct.

These arguments do not apply with the same force to classifications imposing disabilities on the minor children of such illegal entrants.

At the least, those who elect to enter our territory by stealth and in violation of our law should be prepared to bear the consequences, including, but not limited to, deportation.

But the children of those illegal entrants are not comparably situated. Their "parents have the ability to conform their conduct to societal norms," and presumably the ability to remove themselves from the State's jurisdiction; but the children who are plaintiffs in these cases "can affect neither their parents' conduct nor their own status.

Gordon , U. Even if the State found it expedient to control the conduct of adults by acting against their children, legislation directing the onus of a parent's misconduct against his children does not comport with fundamental conceptions of justice.

Moreover, imposing disabilities on the. Obviously, no child is responsible for his birth and penalizing the. Of course, undocumented status is not irrelevant to any proper legislative goal.

Nor is undocumented status an absolutely immutable characteristic since it is the product of conscious, indeed unlawful, action.

It is thus difficult to conceive of a rational justification for penalizing these children for their presence within the United States. Public education is not a "right" granted to individuals by the Constitution.

San Antonio Independent School Dist. Rodriguez , U. But neither is it merely some governmental "benefit" indistinguishable from other forms of social welfare legislation.

Both the importance of education in maintaining our basic institutions, and the lasting impact of its deprivation on the life of the child, mark the distinction.

The "American people have always regarded education and [the] acquisition of knowledge as matters of supreme importance.

Nebraska , U. We have recognized "the public schools as a most vital civic institution for the preservation of a democratic system of government," Abington School District v.

Schempp , U. Norwick , U. Yoder , U. And these historic "perceptions of the public schools as inculcating fundamental values necessary to the maintenance of a democratic political system have been confirmed by the observations of social scientists.

Norwick, supra , U. In addition, education provides the basic tools by which individuals might lead economically productive lives to the benefit of us all.

In sum, education has a fundamental role in maintaining the fabric of our society. We cannot ignore the significant social costs borne by our Nation when select groups are denied the means to absorb the values and skills upon which our social order rests.

In addition to the pivotal role of education in sustaining our political and cultural heritage, denial of education to some isolated group of children poses an affront to one of the goals of the Equal Protection Clause: the abolition of governmental barriers presenting unreasonable obstacles to advancement on the basis of individual merit.

Paradoxically, by depriving the children of any disfavored group of an education, we foreclose the means by which that group might raise the level of esteem in which it is held by the majority.

But more directly, "education prepares individuals to be self-reliant and self-sufficient participants in society. Yoder, supra , U.

Illiteracy is an enduring disability. The inability to read and write will handicap the individual deprived of a basic education each and every day of his life.

The inestimable toll of that deprivation on the social economic, intellectual, and psychological well-being of the individual, and the obstacle it poses to individual achievement, make it most difficult to reconcile the cost or the principle of a status-based denial of basic education with the framework of equality embodied in the Equal Protection Clause.

Board of Education , U. Compulsory school attendance laws and the great expenditures for education both demonstrate our recognition of the importance of education to our democratic society.

It is required in the performance of our most basic public responsibilities, even service in the armed forces.

It is the very foundation of good citizenship. Today it is a principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing him for later professional training, and in helping him to adjust normally to his environment.

In these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education.

Such an opportunity, where the state has undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be made available to all on equal terms.

Undocumented aliens cannot be treated as a suspect class because their presence in this country in violation of federal law is not a "constitutional irrelevancy.

Rodriguez, supra , at , 93 S. Section The stigma of illiteracy will mark them for the rest of their lives. By denying these children a basic education, we deny them the ability to live within the structure of our civic institutions, and foreclose any realistic possibility that they will contribute in even the smallest way to the progress of our Nation.

It is the State's principal argument, and apparently the view of the dissenting Justices, that the undocumented status of these children vel non establishes a sufficient rational basis for denying them benefits that a State might choose to afford other residents.

The State notes that while other aliens are admitted "on an equality of legal privileges with all citizens under non-discriminatory laws," Takahashi v.

Faced with an equal protection challenge respecting the treatment of aliens, we agree that the courts must be attentive to congressional policy; the exercise of congressional power might well affect the State's prerogatives to afford differential treatment to a particular class of aliens.

But we are unable to find in the congressional immigration scheme any statement of policy that might weigh significantly in arriving at an equal protection balance concerning the State's authority to deprive these children of an education.

The Constitution grants Congress the power to "establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization. Drawing upon this power, upon its plenary authority with respect to foreign relations and international commerce, and upon the inherent power of a sovereign to close its borders, Congress has developed a complex scheme governing admission to our Nation and status within our borders.

See Mathews v. Shaughnessy , U. The obvious need for delicate policy judgments has counseled the Judicial Branch to avoid intrusion into this field. Mathews, supra , at 81, 96 S.

The States enjoy no power with respect to the classification of aliens. See Hines v. Davidowitz , U. This power is "committed to the political branches of the Federal Government.

Although it is "a routine and normally legitimate part" of the business of the Federal Government to classify on the basis of alien status, id. See Id.

Mauclet , U. As we recognized in DeCanas v. Bica , U. In DeCanas , the State's program reflected Congress' intention to bar from employment all aliens except those possessing a grant of permission to work in this country.

The State does not claim that the conservation of state educational resources was ever a congressional concern in restricting immigration.

To be sure, like all persons who have entered the United States unlawfully, these children are subject to deportation. But there is no assurance that a child subject to deportation will ever be deported.

An illegal entrant might be granted federal permission to continue to reside in this country, or even to become a citizen.

See, e. In light of the discretionary federal power to grant relief from deportation, a State cannot realistically determine that any particular undocumented child will in fact be deported until after deportation proceedings have been completed.

It would of course be most difficult for the State to justify a denial of education to a child enjoying an inchoate federal permission to remain. We are reluctant to impute to Congress the intention to withhold from these children, for so long as they are present in this country through no fault of their own, access to a basic education.

In other contexts, undocumented status, coupled with some articulable federal policy, might enhance state authority with respect to the treatment of undocumented aliens.

But in the area of special constitutional sensitivity presented by these cases, and in the absence of any contrary indication fairly discernible in the present legislative record, we perceive no national policy that supports the State in denying these children an elementary education.

The State may borrow the federal classification. But to justify its use as a criterion for its own discriminatory policy, the State must demonstrate that the classification is reasonably adapted to " the purposes for which the state desires to use it.

California , U. Appellants argue that the classification at issue furthers an interest in the "preservation of the state's limited resources for the education of its lawful residents.

Of course, a concern for the preservation of resources standing alone can hardly justify the classification used in allocating those resources.

Graham v. Richardson , U. The State must do more than justify its classification with a concise expression of an intention to discriminate.

Examining Board v. Flores de Otero , U. First, appellants appear to suggest that the State may seek to protect itself from an influx of illegal immigrants.

There is no evidence in the record suggesting that illegal entrants impose any significant burden on the State's economy. To the contrary, the available evidence suggests that illegal aliens underutilize public services, while contributing their labor to the local economy and tax money to the state fisc.

The dominant incentive for illegal entry into the State of Texas is the availability of employment; few if any illegal immigrants come to this country, or presumably to the State of Texas, in order to avail themselves of a free education.

See F. Second, while it is apparent that a State may "not. Thompson , U. But the record in no way supports the claim that exclusion of undocumented children is likely to improve the overall quality of education in the State.

And, after reviewing the State's school financing mechanism, the District Court in No. Of course, even if improvement in the quality of education were a likely result of barring some number of children from the schools of the State, the State must support its selection of this group as the appropriate target for exclusion.

In terms of educational cost and need, however, undocumented children are "basically indistinguishable" from legally resident alien children.

Finally, appellants suggest that undocumented children are appropriately singled out because their unlawful presence within the United States renders them less likely than other children to remain within the boundaries of the State, and to put their education to productive social or political use within the State.

Even assuming that such an interest is legitimate, it is an interest that is most difficult to quantify. The State has no assurance that any child, citizen or not, will employ the education provided by the State within the confines of the State's borders.

In any event, the record is clear that many of the undocumented children disabled by this classification will remain in this country indefinitely, and that some will become lawful residents or citizens of the United States.

It is difficult to understand precisely what the State hopes to achieve by promoting the creation and perpetuation of a subclass of illiterates within our boundaries, surely adding to the problems and costs of unemployment, welfare, and crime.

It is thus clear that whatever savings might be achieved by denying these children an education, they are wholly insubstantial in light of the costs involved to these children, the State, and the Nation.

If the State is to deny a discrete group of innocent children the free public education that it offers to other children residing within its borders, that denial must be justified by a showing that it furthers some substantial state interest.

No such showing was made here. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals in each of these cases is. I continue to believe that an individual's interest in education is fundamental, and that this view is amply supported "by the unique status accorded public education by our society, and by the close relationship between education and some of our most basic constitutional values.

Furthermore, I believe that the facts of these cases demonstrate the wisdom of rejecting a rigidified approach to equal protection analysis, and of employing an approach that allows for varying levels of scrutiny depending upon "the constitutional and societal importance of the interest adversely affected and the recognized invidiousness of the basis upon which the particular classification is drawn.

See also Dandridge v. Williams , U. It continues to be my view that a class-based denial of public education is utterly incompatible with the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

I write separately, however, because in my view the nature of the interest at stake is crucial to the proper resolution of these cases.

The "fundamental rights" aspect of the Court's equal protection analysis—the now-familiar concept that governmental classifications bearing on certain interests must be closely scrutinized—has been the subject of some controversy.

Justice Harlan, for example, warned that "[v]irtually every state statute affects important rights. Others have noted that strict scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause is unnecessary when classifications infringing enumerated constitutional rights are involved, for "a state law that impinges upon a substantive right or liberty created or conferred by the Constitution is, of course, presumptively invalid, whether or not the law's purpose or effect is to create any classifications.

Rodriguez, U. See Shapiro v. Still others have suggested that fundamental rights are not properly a part of equal protection analysis at all, because they are unrelated to any defined principle of equality.

These considerations, combined with doubts about the judiciary's ability to make fine distinctions in assessing the effects of complex social policies, led the Court in Rodriguez to articulate a firm rule: fundamental rights are those that "explicitly or implicitly [are] guaranteed by the Constitution.

It therefore squarely rejected the notion that "an ad hoc determination as to the social or economic importance" of a given interest is relevant to the level of scrutiny accorded classifications involving that interest, id.

Classifications infringing substantive constitutional rights necessarily will be invalid, if not by force of the Equal Protection Clause, then through operation of other provisions of the Constitution.

Conversely, classifications bearing on nonconstitutional interests even those involving "the most basic economic needs of impoverished human beings," Dandridge v.

With all this said, however, I believe the Court's experience has demonstrated that the Rodriguez formulation does not settle every issue of "fundamental rights" arising under the Equal Protection Clause.

Only a pedant would insist that there are no meaningful distinctions among the multitude of social and political interests regulated by the States, and Rodriguez does not stand for quite so absolute a proposition.

To the contrary, Rodriguez implicitly acknowledged that certain interests, though not constitutionally guaranteed, must be accorded a special place in equal protection analysis.

Thus, the Court's decisions long have accorded strict scrutiny to classifications bearing on the right to vote in state elections, and Rodriguez confirmed the "constitutional underpinnings of the right to equal treatment in the voting process.

Yet "the right to vote, per se , is not a constitutionally protected right," id. See Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections , U. Instead, regulation of the electoral process receives unusual scrutiny because "the right to exercise the franchise in a free and unimpaired manner is preservative of other basic civil and political rights.

Sims , U. See Dunn v. Blumstein , U. In other words, the right to vote is accorded extraordinary treatment because it is, in equal protection terms, an extraordinary right: a citizen 2 cannot hope to achieve any meaningful degree of individual political equality if granted an inferior right of participation in the political process.

Those denied the vote are relegated, by state fiat, in a most basic way to second-class status. It is arguable, of course, that the Court never should have applied fundamental rights doctrine in the fashion outlined above.

Justice Harlan, for one, maintained that strict equal protection scrutiny was appropriate only when racial or analogous classifications were at issue.

Shapiro v. See Reynolds v. But it is too late to debate that point, and I believe that accepting the principle of the voting cases—the idea that state classifications bearing on certain interests pose the risk of allocating rights in a fashion inherently contrary to any notion of "equality"—dictates the outcome here.

In my view, when the State provides an education to some and denies it to others, it immediately and inevitably creates class distinctions of a type fundamentally inconsistent with those purposes, mentioned above, of the Equal Protection Clause.

Children denied an education are placed at a permanent and insurmountable competitive disadvantage, for an uneducated child is denied even the opportunity to achieve.

And when those children are members of an identifiable group, that group—through the State's action—will have been converted into a discrete underclass.

Other benefits provided by the State, such as housing and public assistance, are of course important; to an individual in immediate need, they may be more desirable than the right to be educated.

But classifications involving the complete denial of education are in a sense unique, for they strike at the heart of equal protection values by involving the State in the creation of permanent class distinctions.

In a sense, then, denial of an education is the analogue of denial of the right to vote: the former relegates the individual to second-class social status; the latter places him at a permanent political disadvantage.

This conclusion is fully consistent with Rodriguez. The Court there reserved judgment on the constitutionality of a state system that "occasioned an absolute denial of educational opportunities to any of its children," noting that "no charge fairly could be made that the system [at issue in Rodriguez ] fails to provide each child with an opportunity to acquire.

And it cautioned that in a case "involv[ing] the most persistent and difficult questions of educational policy,. Thus Rodriguez held, and the Court now reaffirms, that "a State need not justify by compelling necessity every variation in the manner in which education is provided to its population.

Similarly, it is undeniable that education is not a "fundamental right" in the sense that it is constitutionally guaranteed.

Here, however, the State has undertaken to provide an education to most of the children residing within its borders.

And, in contrast to the situation in Rodriguez , it does not take an advanced degree to predict the effects of a complete denial of education upon those children targeted by the State's classification.

In such circumstances, the voting decisions suggest that the State must offer something more than a rational basis for its classification.

Concededly, it would seem ironic to discuss the social necessity of an education in a case that concerned only undocumented aliens "whose very presence in the state and this country is illegal.

But because of the nature of the federal immigration laws and the pre-eminent role of the Federal Government in regulating immigration, the class of children here is not a monolithic one.

Thus, the District Court in the Alien Children Education case found as a factual matter that a significant number of illegal aliens will remain in this country permanently, F.

None of the named plaintiffs is under an order of deportation. As the Court's alienage cases demonstrate, these children may not be denied rights that are granted to citizens, excepting only those rights bearing on political interests.

See Nyquist v. And, as Justice POWELL notes, the structure of the immigration statutes makes it impossible for the State to determine which aliens are entitled to residence, and which eventually will be deported.

Post , at , n. Indeed, any attempt to do so would involve the State in the administration of the immigration laws. Whatever the State's power to classify deportable aliens, then—and whatever the Federal Government's ability to draw more precise and more acceptable alienage classifications—the statute at issue here sweeps within it a substantial number of children who will in fact, and who may well be entitled to, remain in the United States.

Given the extraordinary nature of the interest involved, this makes the classification here fatally imprecise. And, as the Court demonstrates, the Texas legislation is not otherwise supported by any substantial interests.

Because I believe that the Court's carefully worded analysis recognizes the importance of the equal protection and preemption interests I consider crucial, I join its opinion as well as its judgment.

I join the opinion of the Court, and write separately to emphasize the unique character of the cases before us. The classification in question severely disadvantages children who are the victims of a combination of circumstances.

Access from Mexico into this country, across our 2,mile border, is readily available and virtually uncontrollable. Illegal aliens are attracted by our employment opportunities, and perhaps by other benefits as well.

This is a problem of serious national proportions, as the Attorney General recently has recognized.

See ante , at , n. Perhaps because of the intractability of the problem, Congress—vested by the Constitution with the responsibility of protecting our borders and legislating with respect to aliens—has not provided effective leadership in dealing with this problem.

I agree with the Court that their children should not be left on the streets uneducated. Although the analogy is not perfect, our holding today does find support in decisions of this Court with respect to the status of illegitimates.

In Weber v. In these cases, the State of Texas effectively denies to the school-age children of illegal aliens the opportunity to attend the free public schools that the State makes available to all residents.

They are excluded only because of a status resulting from the violation by parents or guardians of our immigration laws and the fact that they remain in our country unlawfully.

The appellee children are innocent in this respect. They can "affect neither their parents' conduct nor their own status.

Our review in a case such as these is properly heightened. Craig v. Boren , U. The classification at issue deprives a group of children of the opportunity for education afforded all other children simply because they have been assigned a legal status due to a violation of law by their parents.

These children thus have been singled out for a lifelong penalty and stigma. A legislative classification that threatens the creation of an underclass of future citizens and residents cannot be reconciled with one of the fundamental purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment.

In these unique circumstances, the Court properly may require that the State's interests be substantial and that the means bear a "fair and substantial relation" to these interests.

Lalli , U. In my view, the State's denial of education to these children bears no substantial relation to any substantial state interest. Both of the District Courts found that an uncertain but significant percentage of illegal alien children will remain in Texas as residents and many eventually will become citizens.

The discussion by the Court, ante , at Part V, of the State's purported interests demonstrates that they are poorly served by the educational exclusion.

Indeed, the interests relied upon by the State would seem to be insubstantial in view of the consequences to the State itself of wholly uneducated persons living indefinitely within its borders.

By contrast, access to the public schools is made available to the children of lawful residents without regard to the temporary nature of their residency in the particular Texas school district.

One need not go so far to conclude that the exclusion of appellees' class 5 of children from state-provided education is a type of punitive discrimination based on status that is impermissible under the Equal Protection Clause.

In reaching this conclusion, I am not unmindful of what must be the exasperation of responsible citizens and government authorities in Texas and other States similarly situated.

Their responsibility, if any, for the influx of aliens is slight compared to that imposed by the Constitution on the Federal Government.

But it hardly can be argued rationally that anyone benefits from the creation within our borders of a subclass of illiterate persons many of whom will remain in the State, adding to the problems and costs of both State and National Governments attendant upon unemployment, welfare, and crime.

Were it our business to set the Nation's social policy, I would agree without hesitation that it is senseless for an enlightened society to deprive any children—including illegal aliens—of an elementary education.

I fully agree that it would be folly—and wrong—to tolerate creation of a segment of society made up of illiterate persons, many having a limited or no command of our language.

Hill , U. We trespass on the assigned function of the political branches under our structure of limited and separated powers when we assume a policymaking role as the Court does today.

The Court makes no attempt to disguise that it is acting to make up for Congress' lack of "effective leadership" in dealing with the serious national problems caused by the influx of uncountable millions of illegal aliens across our borders.

The failure of enforcement of the immigration laws over more than a decade and the inherent difficulty and expense of sealing our vast borders have combined to create a grave socioeconomic dilemma.

It is a dilemma that has not yet even been fully assessed, let alone addressed. However, it is not the function of the Judiciary to provide "effective leadership" simply because the political branches of government fail to do so.

The Court's holding today manifests the justly criticized judicial tendency to attempt speedy and wholesale formulation of "remedies" for the failures—or simply the laggard pace—of the political processes of our system of government.

The Court employs, and in my view abuses, the Fourteenth Amendment in an effort to become an omnipotent and omniscient problem solver.

That the motives for doing so are noble and compassionate does not alter the fact that the Court distorts our constitutional function to make amends for the defaults of others.

Yet the extent to which the Court departs from principled constitutional adjudication is nonetheless disturbing. I have no quarrel with the conclusion that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment applies to aliens who, after their illegal entry into this country, are indeed physically "within the jurisdiction" of a state.

However, as the Court concedes, this "only begins the inquiry. The Equal Protection Clause does not mandate identical treatment of different categories of persons.

Jefferson v. Hackney , U. Reed , U.

August ames bare ass Verordnung EU Nr. Dieses Diskriminierungsverbot ist nur der spezifische Ausdruck des allgemeinen Gleichheitsgrundsatzes, der zu den Grundprinzipien des Jays pov august ames gehört vgl. Ebook-Leseprobe PDF. März in Verkehr gebracht werden dürfen. Drittens haben nach ständiger Rechtsprechung die Mitgliedstaaten dann, wenn die Gemeinschaftsregelung ihnen die Geile omavotze zwischen mehreren Durchführungsmodalitäten lässt, ihr Ermessen unter Beachtung der allgemeinen Grundsätze des Gemeinschaftsrechts auszuüben Urteil vom Urteile vom In force. Verlag 4.

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